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A Discussion of ISP Liability
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Introduction

Online Defamation — Liability for
Publication of Defamatory Words
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I

n today’s world of rampant networked communication, the Internet Service Provider (‘‘ISP’’) finds itself in
a uniquely vulnerable position. As the conduit through
which content is disseminated to a numerically and geographically vast audience, the obvious legal risk to ISPs is
that those who provide content will do so in a way that
attracts legal liability. Like many communications providers (such as publishers or broadcasters), the ISP may
have to assume some responsibility for simply providing
the means of transmitting content. In some cases, the ISP
is more actively involved in the transmission or is knowingly complicit, and the argument for imposing liability
may be even stronger. The digital environment itself also
raises novel concerns. The ISP makes a very attractive
defendant because it is more readily identifiable in the
realm of cyberspace where user anonymity is often the
norm, because of the jurisdictional problems that arise
from the global nature of the Internet, and because the
ISP may have deep pockets. Sometimes the ISP is caught
in the middle of a dispute between a plaintiff and a
pseudonymous defendant, where the ISP is the only legal
entity with any information as to the defendant’s true
identity. The dilemma of the ISP and the legal implications of the role it plays in the networked environment is
a highly contentious and currently unresolved area in
Canadian law. Given the pervasiveness of online communication, however, it is expected that both the Canadian courts and the legislature will soon be forced to
address this issue.

United States
Legislation

I

n the U.S., ISPs are effectively immunized from liability for defamation by third parties by the operation
of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(‘‘CDA’’). 1 As its name suggests, the CDA aims at maintaining standards of decency in cyberspace while encouraging the development and accessibility of new technologies. Further to this goal, the CDA contains a ‘‘Good
Samaritan’’ provision stating that providers of interactive
computer service (which includes ISPs) are not to be
treated as publishers or speakers of information provided
by a third party. The original rationale for this protection
was to encourage ISPs to develop policies of monitoring
and removing offensive content from their servers
without fear of being penalized for taking on an editorial
role and inviting the liability imposed on ‘‘publishers’’
under the law of defamation. Commentators have noted
that while the CDA was enacted to promote decency on
the Internet and encourage self-regulation of ISPs, the
breadth of the Good Samaritan provision has effectively
created a blanket shield from liability for all ISPs, even
those that do not monitor their sites. 2 Cases decided
before the implementation of the CDA are still cited in
the U.S. as courts struggle with the scope of section 230.
Moreover, pre-CDA cases may provide assistance to
Canadian courts where no such legislation exists or is
likely to be enacted.

This paper will attempt to describe some potentially
troublesome areas for ISPs, and give some suggestions as
to how liability can be minimized or avoided. The first
part is a discussion of defamation issues, the second part
is a discussion of copyright and other intellectual property rights, and the third part addresses the question of
liability to subscribers over anonymity issues. We conclude with some contracting tips for ISPs which bolster
ISPs’ protection beyond the legal regime that is currently
in place.

Caselaw
In Cubby v. Compuserve, 3 the District Court of
New York granted the defendant ISP’s motion for summary judgement in a defamation action. The ISP Compuserve gave its users access to various forums, one of
which included a newsletter, Rumorville, containing
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allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff.
Compuserve had a contractual relationship with the creator of the forum but had no independent contract with
the creator of Rumorville. Moreover, Compuserve had
no opportunity to review the contents of the newsletter
before it was uploaded, it did not compensate the creator
of Rumorville for the newsletter and it did not receive
any fees for access to the newsletter (over and above the
general subscription fees charged to all users for access to
all services). Before the action was filed, Compuserve was
given no notice of the allegedly defamatory statements.
The Court held that Compuserve was essentially an electronic library that had little or no editorial control over
the contents of these online publications. Compuserve
was a distributor, not a publisher, and could not be held
liable for distributor liability because it had no knowledge of the defamatory content. The Court stated:
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A computerized database is the functional equivalent of
a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to an electronic news
distributor such as Compuserve than that which is applied
to a public library, book store or news-stand would impose
an undue burden on the free flow of information . . . the
appropriate standard of liability to be applied to Compuserve is whether it knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements. 4

By contrast, a few years later in Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy, 5 the New York Supreme Court found that the
defendant ISP was a publisher and granted the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgement against the ISP. Stratton
involved the anonymous posting of defamatory statements on a bulletin board accessed through Prodigy.
The critical issue was whether Prodigy exercised sufficient editorial control over its bulletin boards to render
it a publisher with the same responsibilities as a newspaper for filtering content. Prodigy had created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who were responsible for
monitoring and censoring bulletin boards according to a
set of company guidelines, it had a system of automatic
screening in place and it held itself out to the public as
controlling the content of its bulletin boards. As such,
the Court had little difficulty concluding that Prodigy
had brought itself within the definition of a publisher,
and was therefore liable.
In response to Stratton, Congress enacted the CDA.
Section 230 has now become a powerful shield from
liability for ISPs. Like Stratton, Zeran v. America Online 6
involved anonymous postings of defamatory statements
on an AOL bulletin board. Upon notification by the
plaintiff, AOL removed the original postings but more
anonymous postings appeared which were not removed.
The Court found that section 230 of the CDA created
federal immunity to any cause of action (not simply
claims of defamation) that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third party user
of the service. Since section 230 precluded courts from
treating ISPs as publishers, AOL was protected from liability. The plaintiff argued that AOL was a distributor
and that the CDA did not shield ISPs from distributor

liability. However, the Court rejected this argument and
found that once the ISP received notice of a potentially
defamatory posting, it was thrust into the role of a traditional publisher and section 230 prohibited treating the
ISP as a publisher.
Following Zeran, section 230 has gained considerable force in shielding ISPs from liability. In Blumenthal
v. Drudge and AOL, 7 AOL escaped liability for defamatory statements made on an online gossip column called
the Drudge Report. Even though AOL had paid the
author of the report for the right to link to his column
and received advance notice of the content of the report,
the Court held that section 230 protected it from liability. According to the Court, through section 230, Congress opted not to hold ISPs liable for their failure to edit,
withhold or restrict access to offensive material through
their services. Although AOL was not a passive conduit
like a telephone company, the CDA reflected a legislative
policy choice to provide immunity even when ISPs took
an aggressive role in making available content provided
by others. While the Court acknowledged that AOL had
taken advantage of the benefits of the CDA without
accepting the burdens of monitoring content, the statutory language was clear and AOL was immune from the
suit. 8
Before the CDA, then, a defamation claim against
an ISP for third party content was focused on the extent
to which the ISP assumed an editorial function. The
enactment of section 230 of the CDA has made this
inquiry moot and it appears that all ISPs will be immune
from liability regardless of the editorial responsibility
they undertake. However, section 230 has its limits.
Recently, in Gucci America v. Hall & Associates, 9 the
defendant ISP was unsuccessful in escaping liability on
the basis of section 230 after it was notified that one of
its subscribers was infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks.
The Court looked to the plain language of the CDA and
held that it was required to interpret section 230 in a
manner that would neither limit nor expand any intellectual property laws. Since this was a case of trademark
infringement, section 230 did not immunize the ISP
from liability. Despite the breadth of section 230, then, it
appears that the U.S. courts will likely only apply it to
protect ISPs in claims of online defamation.
A final U.S. case worth noting, in which the editorial
role of the ISP was the controlling factor, was Lunney v.
Prodigy. 10 Although decided after the CDA, the Court in
Lunney relied on common law principles in excusing
Prodigy from liability. Lunney also involved the anonymous postings of defamatory messages on a Prodigy bulletin board. Upon becoming aware of the situation,
Prodigy removed the offensive postings and closed the
accounts of the author. Contrary to the decision in Blumenthal, the Court likened Prodigy to a telephone company, a mere conduit which is not expected to monitor
the content of its users’ conversations. This was a reasonable distinction since the ISP in Blumenthal had a con-
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tractual relationship with the author of the defamatory
statements whereas here, Prodigy had simply provided
the forum in which the contents were posted. It followed, then, that Prodigy was not a publisher and could
not be held liable. The Court did not go on to consider
the potential for distributor liability, presumably because
Prodigy removed the postings upon notification of their
content. ISPs may therefore be protected from liability at
common law as well as under section 230 of the CDA.

United Kingdom
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Caselaw from the U.K. will likely be of greater value
to Canadian courts since the Canadian common law of
defamation tends to follow English rather than American jurisprudence. In the U.K., the essential inquiry for
ISP liability has been on whether an ISP can rely on the
defence of innocent dissemination. The defence would
immunize an ISP from liability if it could show (1) that it
is not the author, editor or publisher of the statement; (2)
it took reasonable care in relation to its publication; and
(3) it did not know, or had reason to believe, that what it
did caused or contributed to the publication of the
defamatory statement. 11
The Queen’s Bench considered this defence in Godfrey v. Demon Internet, 12 and arrived at a conclusion
that would make ISPs much more vulnerable to liability
for third party content than in the U.S. The facts in
Godfrey were very similar to those in Lunney, involving
the anonymous postings of defamatory statements on a
newsgroup accessed through Demon Internet. However,
unlike Prodigy, Demon Internet did not remove the
defamatory postings at the plaintiff’s request. The Court
held that the transmission of a defamatory posting from
the storage of a news server constituted ‘‘publication’’ of
that posting to any subscriber who accessed the newsgroup containing that posting. Moreover, the ISP could
not claim it was an innocent disseminator because it
knew of the defamatory posting and chose not to
remove it. Although this was not particularly controversial, what was surprising was the Court’s finding that
Demon Internet did not play a passive role because it
chose to receive and store the newsgroup postings and
make them available to users. After reviewing the
caselaw from the U.S., Morland J. concluded that the
defendant Prodigy in Lunney would have been a publisher under U.K. law and would not have escaped liability.
The courts in the U.K., then, apply a much broader
concept of publication. It appears that an ISP need not
take an active role of editing and/or monitoring in order
to invite the title — and responsibility — of publisher.
Simply selecting and providing access to particular newsgroups, chat rooms and bulletin boards will be enough
to attract liability in the U.K. Of course, had Demon
Internet taken swifter action and complied with the
plaintiff’s request to remove the allegedly defamatory

postings, it is possible the Court may have found that it
could rely on the innocent dissemination defence. However, given the Court’s definition of ‘‘publishing’’, this is
not certain.

Canada
As we indicated, to our knowledge there have been
no reported Canadian decisions concerning the liability
of an ISP for Internet defamation. However, unless the
provincial legislatures legislate otherwise (or perhaps Parliament, although it is far from certain that the federal
government has sufficient constitutional jurisdiction to
legislate in this area), the safe assumption is that the
Canadian courts will likely follow some combination of
the English and American (pre- Communications
Decency Act) common law, and decide questions of liability for defamation on the basis of some combination
of the following factors:
(a) To what extent did the ISP merely provide
access, as opposed to content?
(b) Did the ISP purport to or actually exercise control over the defamatory content?
(c) If it exercised control, did it attempt to screen
the contents for defamatory or other offensive
content?
(d) Could the ISP reasonably have known about the
offensive content?
(e) If it did not make any attempts to screen content in the ordinary course, or could not reasonably be expected to know about the content,
was it notified?
(f) If it knew, or was notified, what steps did it take?
Although this is essentially a fair approach, in some
ways these principles lead to the one slightly strange
result that American legislators were attempting to avoid
by enacting section 230 of the CDA: an ISP that completely ignores the content on its network until someone
complains is excused from liability, whereas the ‘‘Good
Samaritan’’ ISP that takes an active interest in the content may be found liable. The natural consequence is
that ISPs will ignore the content on their networks, and
investigate only when someone complains. Ironically,
section 230 of the CDA does not help, and may even
lead to a worse result: by excusing ISPs from liability
regardless of whether they review content, not only does
the legislation give ISPs an incentive to ignore the content, but also to ignore any complaints, secure in the
knowledge that they will not be liable in any event. In
any event, unless similar legislation is introduced in
Canada (or a province), ISPs should be very cautious if
they do decide to exert control over content, and act
promptly upon receiving a complaint concerning defamatory postings.
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any users consider the Internet to be an anonymous forum. Most posters are able to use a pseudonym, if they are required to post any name at all.
Often, the only way to trace a user is by his or her
Internet Protocol (IP) address, a set of 4 numbers that is
unique to each user at any given time. 13 These IP
addresses can be traced back to the ISP, who may be able
to then identify its customer from the IP address and the
date and time of the posting. 14 Hence, when defamatory
or other objectionable statements are posted, it is often
the case that the complaining party is only able to
obtain, at most, the poster’s IP address. In those circumstances, the complaining party will then look to the ISP
to provide identifying information.
These requests create a tension for ISPs (as well as
other companies that provide access to and services on
the Internet). To remain competitive, most ISPs must
promise not to disclose information that would reveal
their users’ identities in their privacy policy or terms of
use. Hence, they will rarely do so merely on request. In
the civil context, this often results in the plaintiff
bringing a motion or application 15 to compel the ISP to
reveal the IP address and/or identity of the prospective
defendant. In the criminal context, there is no analogous
mechanism, so typically the police will obtain a search
warrant under the Criminal Code.
There are two issues that an ISP must consider
when it receives notice of a motion or application. First,
the ISP must decide whether to take a position, and if so,
what it should be. Most ISPs do not have an interest in
maintaining the anonymity of their subscribers. Rather,
their interest is in maintaining a good business reputation and minimizing the legal and administrative costs
associated with these requests. ISPs that have a clause in
their terms of use that state, for example, that they will
not reveal their users’ identities ‘‘except in accordance
with a court order or other compulsory process’’ are in
the best position, since they can take the position that
they will not participate in the proceeding, but if the
court issues an order, they will comply.
ISPs that have an affirmative promise to maintain
privacy without this exception are, potentially, in a more
difficult position. There is no doubt that they should
comply with a court order, if obtained. However, having
made this promise to their users, they could easily be
criticized for failing to affirmatively oppose the motion
or application. In fact, in the United States, Yahoo! was
sued by an Internet poster who went by the pseudonym
‘‘Aquacool’’ for complying with what appeared to be a
legally valid subpoena. Aquacool’s complaints were,
essentially, that Yahoo! did not insist on the procedural
formalities that would ordinarily be applicable (essentially personal service and acceptance by an in-state court
for an out-of-state subpoena), that Yahoo! had promised
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more privacy protection than it had delivered by
acceding to the subpoena, and that Yahoo! had negligently misrepresented its terms of service as it failed to
notify him prior to disclosing his identity. Although this
suit was ultimately discontinued, it is a reminder to ISPs
that they should make a clear statement in their terms of
use as to what their position will be when a subscriber’s
identity is sought by a third party, and then follow it in
every case.
The Aquacool case also raises another important
issue for ISPs: to what extent should they notify their
subscriber of the impending motion or application?
While the ISP has no or little interest in maintaining
anonymity, the user presumably does. However, it is the
ISP, and not the user, who is served with the notice of
motion or application. If it does not oppose the order,
the truly interested party (the poster) will not be able to
defend his or her anonymity until after it has already
been lost. Hence, prudent practice suggests that the ISP
should advise the user of the pending proceeding, and
pass along any materials that have been served. This
enables the poster to retain counsel and attend on his or
her behalf to argue for maintaining anonymity.
Recently, Mr. Justice Spiegel heard such a motion and
refused to grant the order requested at that time,
adjourning the motion and ordering the Web site in
question to serve the three pseudonymous posters with
the motion materials and notice of the return of the
motion. 16 If other judges follow this practice, it may very
well be that both the plaintiff and the ISP will want the
subscribers notified in advance of the return of the
motion, to ensure that the matter can be resolved with
only one court appearance.
One small variation to this scenario is the possibility
that, in very serious cases, the plaintiff will want to obtain
an Anton Pillar order to obtain the defendant’s (easily
destroyed) computer for evidentiary purposes on an ex
parte basis. In those cases, ISPs are once again caught
between the plaintiff (who has likely repeatedly
threatened the ISP with a lawsuit if they fail to cooperate) and the defendant (who is the ISP’s customer and
who may sue if his or her identity is revealed without
notice). In those cases, it would seem that the salutary
practice would be to take affirmative pre-litigation
action, such as including a clause that the ISP has the
contractual right to reveal the subscriber’s identity
without notice, a good limitation of liability clause, and
perhaps even an arbitration clause, which tends to discourage frivolous lawsuits. However, once the litigation
has been commenced, the ISP is likely within its rights to
take the position that if the plaintiff wishes to keep the
order confidential, it is necessary for the judge to so
order, and to seal the record under section 137 of the
Courts of Justice Act. In cases so extreme that an Anton
Pillar order is sought, it should not be that difficult to
obtain such an order, and it relieves the ISP of having to
make this determination.
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Online Copyright Infringement
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n the Internet era, copyright has gone from being an
obscure area of the law, familiar to relatively few specialized practitioners and academics, to being a popular
conversation topic. Type the word ‘‘copyright’’ into
Google (the search engine), and you will find approximately 139,000,000 hits in 0.05 seconds. The fundamental change of the digital age has been the ability to
make unlimited copies of text, music, pictures, software
and anything else that can be expressed in machine
code. Moreover, this can be done essentially anonymously, and by millions of people at the same time.
Under these circumstances, it is only natural that those
with an interest in preserving the exclusivity that copyright provides (i.e., artists, writers, publishers, etc.) will
look to the gatekeepers rather than the individual consumer in an attempt to limit the potential infringements
facilitated by digital technology. In this section, we
describe the American legislative regime, and in particular the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as well as
some caselaw. We then compare this to the Canadian
legislative framework which has not been specifically
amended to reflect some of the liability issues that may
arise. We conclude this section by discussing some proposed legislative changes.

United States
Legislation
In 1998, the U.S. ratified the WIPO treaties through
the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(‘‘DMCA’’). Under Title II of the DMCA, online service
providers (such as ISPs) can avoid liability if one of its
subscribers infringes copyright by following the notice
and takedown provisions detailed in the Act. The DMCA
contains four ‘‘Safe Harbours’’ of conduct for ISPs: ISPs
can limit liability based on (1) transitory communication; 17 (2) system caching; 18 (3) storage of information on
systems or networks at direction of user; 19 and (4) information locations tools. 20 To avoid liability, an ISP must
not have actual knowledge/awareness of facts indicating
that the material is infringing, the ISP must not receive
any financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, and upon receiving notification of a
claimed infringement, the ISP must expeditiously take
down and disable access to the material. 21
In order to benefit from the limitations on liability
in the DMCA, an ISP must designate an agent (with the
Copyright Office) to receive notices of infringing activity
and must implement a policy of terminating the
accounts of subscribers who repeatedly infringe. In short,
the DMCA encourages ISPs to be responsible and in
return, an ISP is granted immunity from liability. Should
an ISP choose not to follow the DMCA provisions, a
copyright owner retains the right to seek financial damages from the ISP for contributory or vicarious infringement. As with the law of defamation, then, cases prior to

the legislation will still be important in the U.S., and of
particular relevance in Canada where no equivalent legislation is in force or being seriously considered.
Caselaw
One of the earlier, and oft-cited, cases of ISP liability
for copyright infringement is Playboy Enterprises v.
Frena. 22 The defendant in Frena operated a bulletin
board service (‘‘BBS’’) 23 through which one of his subscribers uploaded infringing copies of Playboy photos.
Although the defendant immediately removed the
infringing material from his service upon being notified
of the matter and began monitoring his service to prevent additional infringement, the Court found the defendant liable for usurping the plaintiff’s right to publicly
distribute and display its copyrighted work. According to
the Court, the lack of intent or knowledge to infringe
was not relevant in assessing liability and if anything, the
innocence of the defendant would go to the issue of
damages.
The case was even stronger for imposing liability on
an ISP in Sega Enterprises v. Maphia, 24 where the BBS
operator solicited subscribers to download copyrighted
Sega games onto its service and charged other subscribers a fee to download the games for their personal
use. The Court easily found the defendant liable for
contributory infringement since it had played an active
role in the infringement, providing the facilities for copying, as well as directing and encouraging the copying.
Although the Court in Frena did not consider the
lack of editorial control by the BBS operator a relevant
factor in assessing liability, this was the critical factor in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom. 25 Netcom gave
its subscribers access to a BBS on which a user had made
a series of postings criticizing the Church of Scientology,
using the Church’s copyrighted materials. The BBS
would not remove the postings without proof of the
plaintiff’s copyright (which the plaintiff was unwilling to
give) and Netcom would not disable access to the postings because it could not do so without cutting off all of
the other users of the BBS. The Court found that
Netcom did not create or control the content of the
information available to its subscribers. The Court analogized Netcom to the owner of a copying machine who
lets the public make copies but is not responsible for the
infringing activities of its customers. An ISP that acts as a
mere conduit would not be liable for direct infringement because the necessary element of volition or causation was lacking. Netcom was also not vicariously liable
because it did not receive any fees relating to the
infringement (aside from its fixed fee to all subscribers
for access to all services). However, the Court found that
Netcom may be liable for contributory infringement
since it had knowledge of the infringing material and
ignored the request to remove the postings. The Court
speculated that allowing public distribution of infringing
material and failing to prevent further damage could
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constitute substantial participation in the infringement.
Although this was only a motion for summary judgment,
the decision clearly indicates that an ISP may be liable as
a contributory infringer once it is made aware of the
infringement and neglects to rectify the problem. 26
Frena, Sega and Netcom were all decided before the
DMCA was passed. ISPs that abide by the notice and
takedown provisions in the DMCA will now avoid liability for copyright infringement. The germane question
is no longer how to deal with the changes in technology,
but rather how to interpret the various provisions of the
statute. 27
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Canada
The Current Legal Position
At this stage, it is not clear how Canadian courts will
address the issue of ISP liability for online copyright
infringement. 28 Certainly, the courts in the U.S. have
much more extensively considered this issue, and
Canada will likely be influenced by many of the policy
arguments that pervade those judgments. 29 However,
there are differences between the Canadian and U.S.
statutes, and, as the Supreme Court of Canada has
reminded us, Canadian courts should be wary of merely
adopting the American approach. 30
Under Canada’s current copyright regime, ISPs are
potentially vulnerable to liability for infringement of telecommunication and reproduction rights. Subsection
3(1) of the Copyright Act states:
3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘‘copyright’’, in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce
the work or any substantial part thereof in any material
form whatever . . . and includes the sole right
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any
translation of the work,
(b) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or
artistic work, to communicate the work to the
public by telecommunication
and to authorize any such acts.

‘‘Telecommunication’’ is defined broadly to include
‘‘any transmission of signs, signals, writing, images or
sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio,
visual, optical or other electromagnetic system’’. 31
At first glance, these provisions would appear to
catch ISPs. However, the Copyright Act contains certain
exceptions which appear flexible enough to protect
against ISP liability. In particular, ISPs should be able to
rely on paragraph 2.4(1)(b):
A person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public consists
of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for
another person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter does not communicate the work or other subject-matter to the public.

Just as a letter carrier or a telephone company
would be saved from liability by the operation of paragraph 2.4(1)(b), so too should the ISP. Of course, the

above provisions would only apply to passive ISPs who
do not authorize or actively engage in the infringing
activity. Thus, an ISP could not escape liability by relying
solely on its status as a communications provider and
would attract liability should it play a greater role in the
infringement.
The potential scope and limits of paragraph 2.4(1)(b)
as applied to ISPs was recently considered by the Federal
Court of Appeal in the judicial review of the Copyright
Board’s decision in Tariff 22, styled SOCAN v. Canadian
Association of Internet Providers et al. 32 Tariff 22 is a
royalty scheme proposed by Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers of Canada (‘‘SOCAN’’) for the
transmission of musical works over the Internet. Under
Tariff 22, the Copyright Board held that ISPs acting as
passive intermediaries when communicating musical
works to the public by telecommunication will be saved
from liability by the common carrier exemption in paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act. ISPs cannot benefit
from the exemption, however, when they post content,
associate with others that offer content, create imbedded
links, moderate newsgroups or engage in activities that
extend beyond simply providing the means of communication. 33
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Tariff 22
decision in most respects. According to the Court, three
conditions must be met in order for paragraph 2.4(1)(b)
to apply to an ISP: (i) its activities must amount to the
means of telecommunication; (ii) these means must be
necessary or enabling another person to communicate a
work to the public; and (iii) the activities in question
must constitute the ISP’s only act with respect to the
communication. 34 Although the Court recognized that
the services provided by ISPs were unlike the more passive physical facilities provided by traditional carriers, it
held that the ‘‘means of communication’’ must be interpreted in an expansive way, capable of including technological developments. The Court emphasized that those
simply providing the means of telecommunication were
passive participants lacking the practical ability to control and monitor content. Importantly, the court appreciated that it is not currently technologically feasible, or at
least very expensive and impractical, for ISPs to effectively monitor and prevent the transmission of material.
This would, of course, be different when the ISP acts in
concert with content providers, and therefore could not
benefit from the exception under those circumstances.
While most of the core activities of an ISP are saved
by the common carrier exemption, the majority of the
Court concluded that caching was not caught by the
exemption. Caching enhances the speed of transmission
and reduces the cost to the ISP but it is not ‘‘necessary’’
for communication. Hence, caching was not protected
by the exemption in paragraph 2.4(1)(b), and therefore,
to the extent that copyrighted material was being
cached, it would constitute an infringement. Justice
Sharlow, in dissent on this point, disagreed, stating that
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the majority had taken too strict an approach to the
definition of ‘‘necessary’’ and that the notion of necessity
should include mechanisms for improving the functionality of the means of communication.
The other interesting development with respect to
ISPs and copyright that arises out of the Tariff 22 case is
SOCAN’s argument that when an ISP simply provides
customers with an Internet connection, they implicitly
authorize the communication of material. However, the
Court rejected that argument, finding that since the ISP
typically has no contractual or economic relationship
with a content provider, they merely facilitate, but do
not authorize, communication. Host servers, which store
material rather than transmit it to the end user, are in a
different position, since they do have a contractual relationship with content providers. This arguably increases
the host server’s opportunity to monitor and remove
material. Nonetheless, the Court held that host servers
merely facilitate the communication of material by supplying equipment that enables others to communicate.
Host servers, then, are also passive participants and can
not be said to authorize communication. The Court did
suggest, however, that a contractual term prohibiting the
posting of infringing material, although not determinative, would help make it clear that the operator does not
sanction the communication. Finally, the Court found
that implicit authorization may be inferred if host servers
neglected to remove infringing material once notified of
its existence.
The rationale behind the common carrier exemption under the Copyright Act is similar to the innocent
dissemination defence for the common law of defamation — a person who transmits information without
(ordinarily) having any capacity to control the information transmitted ought not to be held civilly liable for
someone else’s use of their transmission facilities. However, when the transmitter takes on some other role, they
are no longer entitled to the benefit of that protection.
Although there have been no Canadian decisions
holding an ISP liable for copyright infringement in the
civil courts, a bulletin board operator was convicted
criminally under the Copyright Act. In R. v. M. (J.P.), 35 the
accused was a 17-year-old operator of a computer bulletin board which allowed users to download copyright
protected software programs. The accused played a very
active role in the infringement, uploading the copyrighted material, providing access to users, and even supplying the software required to copy the programs. The
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found that the accused’s
actions were an infringement of the right of telecommunication and further, that in controlling the means and
manner by which the users of the BBS accessed and
downloaded the material, the operator was also criminally liable for ‘‘distributing’’ the infringing material.
Although the Court did not discuss the operation of
paragraph 2.4(1)(b) presumably the accused could not
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have benefited from the intermediary exception given
his active involvement in the infringing activity.
Public Policy Development
The Consultation Paper issued by Industry Canada
and Canadian Heritage provides some further indication
of the way in which the issue of ISP liability for online
copyright infringement may unfold. 36 The paper outlines a proposal which would include a limited role for
government regulation to establish copyright liability
rules that are clear and fair. The paper raises the possibility of establishing a complaints-driven notice and
takedown process similar to the DMCA that would
address the concerns of both rights-holders and ISPs.
Importantly, an ISP that blocks access to an allegedly
infringing site in good faith would not be liable for the
harm suffered in consequence of this action. However,
the paper acknowledges the concerns about a notice and
takedown regime, specifically that such a system would
represent a considerable overhead expense for ISPs and
that it may discourage ISPs from participating in voluntary licensing-based initiatives from the online environment.
The Canadian Association of Internet Providers
(‘‘CAIP’’), a private organization whose current members
provide more than 85 per cent of the Internet connections to Canadian homes, schools, and businesses, has
(perhaps not surprisingly) responded to the Consultation
Paper with comments that argue for greater self-regulation. CAIP dislikes the ‘‘drastic and potentially legally
contentious action by an ISP of actively taking targeted
content down without a court order.’’ 37 Instead, it proposes a ‘‘Notice and Notice’’ regime where copyright
holders alleging infringement would issue statutorydefined notice to an ISP and ISPs, in turn, would provide
a statutory-defined notice of the allegation to the party
responsible for the alleged infringement. Should this process not result in the voluntary removal of the allegedly
infringing content, CAIP argues an ISP should only be
required to take down the content when served with a
court order. According to CAIP, ‘‘requiring ISPs to take
down content based solely on the allegations of a third
party, would run counter to the fundamental principle
of Canadian law that someone is innocent until proven
guilty’’. 38
In our view, the real issue behind this debate is the
‘‘default’’ position and, conversely, who is required to go
to court to preserve their preferred outcome. A notice
and take-down regime ensures that potentially infringing
materials are immediately removed from the Web site
(since most ISPs are indifferent as to whether the material stays or is removed, but will remove it to ensure they
suffer no liability). Hence, it is the party who posted the
allegedly infringing material that will have to seek a
court order to reinstate it. Conversely, a notice and
notice regime, since it does not require the ISP to remove
the material to escape liability, places the onus on the
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copyright owner to seek a court order. If litigation were
costless and instantaneous, which regime is selected
should not particularly matter. However, since the reality
is quite the opposite, the time and expense of seeking a
court order means that the default position will likely
prevail in the overwhelming number of cases.
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There is no obvious solution to this debate. On the
one hand, we find the ‘‘innocent until proven guilty’’
argument in support of notice and notice thoroughly
unpersuasive. The consequences (removal of the
offending materials) are much less than a criminal sanction, and copyright owners regularly obtain interlocutory
injunctions merely by demonstrating a prima facie case.
On the other hand, the notice and take-down regime
effectively reverses the ordinary situation, in which the
copyright holder is required to seek the court’s protection by showing there has been a violation of copyright,
and the alleged infringer is not required to seek the
court’s permission by showing there is not. If this is to be
reversed for the Internet, copyright holders should
clearly articulate a reason, such as (perhaps) the detrimental effects that digital technology has had on their
ability to protect their works.
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sibly. We end this paper with some (perhaps obvious)
tips for ISPs that can help them avoid litigation or liability: 39
●

An ISP should ensure that the terms and conditions of its subscription contracts clearly indicate
that users are not to make illegal or civilly
unlawful use of their access.

●

An ISP should institute and implement an
‘‘Authorized Use’’ policy and such policy should
include a contact name within the organization
for customers who experience problems; the
policy should be communicated to subscribers
and the general public, and should be periodically reviewed and updated.

●

An ISP should implement a ‘‘Privacy Policy’’ that
clearly articulates the extent of the protection
offered, and not offered, to its subscribers. In
particular, it should not make unqualified
promises to its subscribers that their privacy
and/or personal information will be protected
and/or remain confidential; such terms should
be tempered with words such as ‘‘unless we
believe it to be required by law’’ or ‘‘subject to
legal process or compulsion’’.

●

An ISP should have a system in place to quickly
remove obscene, infringing or defamatory content from its servers, and the terms of this regime
should be clearly communicated to subscribers.

●

An ISP should consider configuring its network
to bar access to sites that are known as defamatory, illegal, obscene or infringing.

●

An ISP should specify the appropriate jurisdiction in the event of a legal dispute.

●

An ISP’s user agreement should have a good
limitation of liability, that includes the following
elements:

Conclusion and Pre-Litigation
Practice

A

lthough the legal consequences of owning and
operating an ISP have yet to be considered in
Canada, we have the benefit of examining the two contrasting approaches to ISP liability taken by the U.S. and
the U.K. When faced with a seemingly novel legal issue,
some jurisdictions (such as the U.S.) respond with an
arsenal of legislation to combat the problem, while
others (such as Canada and the U.K.) tend towards
adapting existing laws. Despite the difference in
approach, however, the end result is surprisingly not that
dissimilar. All three jurisdictions endorse responsible
conduct on the part of an ISP and reward this responsibility with limited liability. Although the CDA is a powerful shield for ISPs charged with online defamation, an
ISP will also be protected in the U.K. (and likely Canada)
if it meets the requirements for innocent dissemination.
Likewise, the notice and takedown provisions of the
DMCA also encourage ISPs to be alert and responsive to
online infringement. The lesson for ISPs is that the likelihood of liability is significantly reduced if they take some
reasonable precautions and conduct themselves respon-

●

a clause that strictly limits liability to a subscriber to the cost of the service;

●

an indemnity obliging the subscriber to
indemnify the ISP for any content posted;

●

an arbitration clause to attempt to avoid class
proceedings; and

●

for ISPs servicing the consumer, a representation and warranty by the user that the service
will be used for personal use only, and not for
business use.
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